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Abstract
This work tests the predictions of Sutton’s model of independent submarkets for the Italian
retail banking industry. In the ﬁrst part of this paper, I develop a model of endogenous mergers
to evidence the relationship between ﬁrms’ conduct, market entry and market structure. In
the second part, I identify the submarket dimension and estimate the relationship between
market size and market structure using data on bank branches. The size of the submarkets
turned out to be at most provincial whereas the limiting concentration index - as argued by
Sutton for industries with exogenous sunk costs - goes to zero as the market becomes larger.
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responsibility.1 Introduction
Sutton’s model of independent submarkets emphasizes the strategic choice of sunk costs and,
unlike the traditional structure-conduct-performance approach, considers how changes in ﬁrms’
conduct aﬀects the condition of entry, altering by consequence market structure. Under this scheme,
both homogeneous-horizontally diﬀerentiated products and advertising-R&D intensive (vertically
diﬀerentiated products) industries can be analysed. For the former type of industries, with ﬁxed
sunk costs, it is possible to show an inverse relationship between market size and market structure.
For the latter type of industries, where sunk costs are endogenous, such a negative relationship does
not necessarily emerge as market size increases. This is because sunk costs, such as advertising or
R&D expenditure, raise with market size. Such expenditures are choice variables of (perceived)
quality: by increasing the level of advertising-R&D, ﬁrms are able to gain (or to maintain) market
share. Therefore, as market size becomes larger, an ‘escalation mechanism’ could raise ﬁxed costs
per ﬁrm to such an extent that the negative relationship between market size and market structure
will break down. Sutton’s model oﬀers therefore very clear and testable predictions about the
relationship between market-size and market-concentration.
The aim to this paper is to analyse the Italian retail banking industry as a special case of the
ﬁrst type of industries, since products are rather standardized and there is a limited scope for cost-
decreasing or quality increasing investments. This industry can be viewed as made of a large number
of local markets that arise because there are many diﬀerent geographical locations throughout the
country: in every submarket products are fairly good substitutes and banks compete against each
other by means of their branch locations. The degree of substitutability is substantially lower for
products and services oﬀered in neighbour submarkets.
In the ﬁrst part of this paper, relying on the model developed by Vasconcelos (2006), I examine
the ﬁrm strategic behaviour referring to a three-stage non cooperative game. In line with Sutton’s
theory, the aim is to highlight the relationship between ﬁrm conduct, entry and market structure
while explicitly allowing for a merger process in the industry. In so doing, it is possible to show
that the incentives to merge to a monopoly are lead by the intensity of competition and by the
degree of product substitution. This ultimately shows how the number of banks as well as the share
1of the main bank are determined in each submarket, and oﬀers indications on the variables to be
used in the empirical section. In the second part, I will estimate the market structure-market size
relationship in the Italian retail banking industry. Testing this relationship empirically requires
identifying a set of independent submarkets. In order to do that, I estimate the number of ﬁrms
in each province using data on the national bank branch location. To take into account that the
number of ﬁrms is discrete and greater than zero, a truncated Poisson and Negative Binomial
models are used. This analysis conﬁrms that the province (at most) is the size of each submarket.
In fact, ﬁrm variables related to neighbour provinces turned out to be insigniﬁcant in determining
the number of bank in each province. Once the size of the submarket has been identiﬁed, I will
investigate the market structure-market size relationship by regressing the one ﬁrm concentration
ratio on market size variables. As the limiting concentration ratio approaches zero as market size
goes to inﬁnity, the hypothesis of exogenous sunk costs for the retail banking industry can be
accepted.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework to
analyse the relationship between ﬁrm conduct and concentration based on the Sutton approach.
Sections 3 and 4 respectively describe the banking industry referring to this framework and the
characteristic and the construction of the dataset. In section 5 the econometric model and results
are presented. Conclusions are in the ﬁnal section.
2 The theoretical approach
Sutton (1991, 1997, 1998) describes the impact of ﬁrm conduct on market structure identifying two
key aspects: the intensity of competition and the level of endogenous sunk costs. Considering these
elements, he distinguishes between two general types of industry. One class is characterized by
industries that produce homogeneous and horizontally diﬀerentiated products. The other category
is composed of industries engaged in the production of vertically diﬀerentiated products. In the
ﬁrst type of industries, the only important sunk costs are the exogenously determined setup costs,
given by the technology. In such industries Sutton (1998) predicts a lower bound to concentration,
which goes to zero as the market size increases and rises with the intensity of price competition.
2The idea is that as market size increases, proﬁts also increase, and given free entry, other ﬁrms will
enter the market until the last entrant just covers the exogenous cost for entry. Also, the higher the
competition, the higher the concentration index. In fact, as the competition gets stronger, the entry
becomes less proﬁtable and the higher the level of concentration is to be in order to allow ﬁrms
to cover their entry cost1. It is important to underline that the intensity of competition will not
simply represent ﬁrm strategies but, rather, the functional relationship between market structure,
prices and proﬁts. It is derived by institutional factors, and therefore is not only captured by the
price-cost margin. More generally, an increase in the intensity of competition could be represented
by any exogenous inﬂuence that makes entry less proﬁtable, e.g the introduction of a competition
law (Symeodonis (2000), Symeodonis (2002)). In the second type of industries sunk costs are
endogenous. Firms pay some sunk cost to enter but can make further investments to enhance
their demand. As market size increases, the incentive to gain market share through advertising
and R&D expenditure also increases, leading to higher ﬁxed cost per ﬁrm. Even though room
for other ﬁrms is potentially created, the ‘escalation mechanism’ will raise the endogenous ﬁxed
costs, possibly breaking down the negative structure-size relationship that exists in the other type
of industries. For such industries Sutton’s model predicts that the minimum equilibrium value of
seller concentration remains positive as the market grows2.
Sutton’s model oﬀers very clear predictions for the ﬁrst group of industries whereas it is not
possible for industries where sunk costs are endogenous. Despite Sutton’s insights on the relation-
ship between market concentration and market size, there are few empirical works testing these
predictions. Previous works that test the Sutton approach are Sutton (1998) for the US Cement
Industry, Buzzacchi and Valletti (2005) for the Italian Motor Insurance Industry, Asplund and
Sandin (1999) for the Swedish Driving Schools Sector, (Walsh and Whelan (2002)) in Carbonated
Soft Drinks in the Irish retail market, Hutchinson et al. (2006) across manufacturing industries in
UK and Belgium, and Ellickson (2007) for the supermarket industry in the United States. These
1A way to model an increase in the ‘toughness of price competition’ is to consider a movement from monopoly
model to Cournot and Bertrand model. For any given market size, the higher the competition at ﬁnal stage, the
lower the number of ﬁrms entering at stage 1, and the higher the concentration index (ex-post). See Sutton (2002).
2To be more precise, Sutton goes further in distinguishing within the endogenous cost categories between low-α
and high-α industries. In the low-α type industries, due to R&D trajectories, we will still observe low level of
concentration
3papers mainly test Sutton’s predictions by typically looking if a measure of ﬁrm inequality - such
as the Gini coeﬃcient - increases with the number of submarkets. Speciﬁc to the banking sector
are the works of Dick (2007) for the Banking Industry in the United States and de Juan (2003) for
the Spanish Retail Banking Sector. Although Dick (2007) investigated the relationship between
market size and market concentration, she considered the banking industry without distinguishing
the retail segment from the wholesale. In particular, she focused on banking quality through a
set of variables, such as geographic diversiﬁcation, employees compensation and branch density,
ﬁnding a non-decreasing concentration ratio as market size gets larger. She concluded that endoge-
nous quality model characterized the industry. de Juan (2003) analysed instead another important
insight of Sutton’s analysis: the degree of concentration and the level of aggregation of submarkets.
Focusing on retail market only, and after having identiﬁed the individual submarkets, she tested
the bound on the inequality of ﬁrm size distribution at diﬀerent levels, local, regional and national.
The purpose of this paper is to verify if empirical evidence for the Italian retail banking industry is
consistent with Sutton’s predictions. To apply this framework to the Italian banking industry is of
interest since during the nineties it experienced a deregulation and consolidation process. There-
fore, in order to identify the relationship proposed by Sutton, the choice of the year is crucial. I
will assume that the industry reached in 2005, the year of the analysis, an equilibrium. Similar to
de Juan (2003), I will make an eﬀort to empirically test the size of the submarket but I will depart
from her work by investigating the market size- market concentration relationship. As the focus
is on the retail banking, this paper also diﬀerentiates from Dick (2007) as she considered both the
industry segments, wholesale and retail. The present paper is also strictly related to the theoret-
ical analysis developed by Cerasi (1996). Cerasi developed a model of retail banking competition
in which banks compete ﬁrst in branching and then in prices. In line with Sutton’s analysis her
model predicts that deregulation should lead to an increase in the degree of concentration whereas,
with respect to branching, an increase in market size is followed by a decrease in the degree of
concentration in branching.
43 Exogenous sunk cost industries: the model
Using the model developed by Vasconcelos (2006), as modiﬁed in order to explicitly account for
the intensity of competition, this section analyses the market size-concentration relationship in
exogenous sunk cost industries. In such industries, ﬁrms will face some sunk cost to enter but
cannot make further investment in order to enhance their demand. Assuming that all consumers











xkxl + M, (1)
where xk is the quantity of good k and M denotes expenditure on outside goods whose price
is ﬁxed exogenously at unity. The parameter σ, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, measures the degree of substitution
between goods3. When σ = 0 the cross product term in the utility function vanishes so that
product varieties are independent in demand, whereas if σ = 1, the goods are perfect substitutes.
For the utility function (1), the individual demand for good k is:




If there are S identical consumers in the market and we denote with xk the per-capita quantity
demanded of good k, market demand for this good is Sxk.
Considering now a three stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, a suﬃciently large number of ex-ante
identical ﬁrms, N0, simultaneously decide whether or not to enter the market incurring an entry
cost of . In the second stage, ﬁrms that have decided to enter decide to join a coalition. All the
ﬁrms that have decided to join the same coalition then merge. In the third stage, ﬁrms set their
output. All coalitions are assumed to face the same marginal cost of production c, which we can
normalize to zero.
3This is a quadratic utility function and it has previously used by Spence(1976), Shaked and Sutton (1990),
Sutton (1997, 1998) and Symeodonis (2000). The banking sector is usually analysed under hotelling-type model.
However, it is possible to show that any hotelling-type model is a special case of vertical production diﬀerentiation.
See Cremer and Thisse (1991).
54 The game: equilibrium analysis
In stage 2, each ﬁrm i ∈ {1,....,N} simultaneously announces a list of players that it wishes to
form a coalition with. Firms that make exactly the same announcement form a coalition together.
For example, if ﬁrms 1 an 2 both announced coalition {1,2,3}, while ﬁrm 3 announced something
diﬀerent, then only players 1 and 2 form a coalition. Since all ﬁrms are initially symmetric, members
of each coalition are assumed to equally share the ﬁnal stage proﬁt.
Let λ =
dxj
dxi represent ﬁrm i’s conjectural variation, that is its expectation about the change in
its competitors production resulting from a change in its own production level, and assume that
this conjecture is identical for all ﬁrms (λi =
dxj
dxi = λ).




2(2 + (N − 1)σ(1 + λ))
(3)
and the proﬁt of each of the N ﬁrms is
SΠi = S
1 + λ(N − 1)σ
2(2 + (N − 1)σ(1 + λ))2 − F (4)
Let Λ be equal to σ(N −1)λ. It is possible to refer to Λ as the competitive intensity of the industry,
with lower values of Λ corresponding to more intense competition.
For F ≥ 0, N ≥ 2 and −1 ≤ Λ ≤ 1 , and 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 each ﬁrm’s proﬁt is a decreasing function of
the number of ﬁrms in the industry, its competitive intensity and the amount of ﬁxed costs. Two
reasons could lead ﬁrms to merge: market power and eﬃciency. To maintain things simpler, I avoid
to account for eﬃciency gains. In this analysis, ﬁrms could not make any further investments to
enhance their quality (and hence the demand) of the product oﬀered. So, it possible to set F = 0.
In any case, a clear picture in a similar framework is oﬀered by Rodrigues (2001).
Following the traditional backward induction procedure, I analyze the condition under which I
get a monopoly in exogenous sunk cost industries model.
6Quantity setting stage Let N2, N2 ≤ N ≤ N0, denote the number of coalitions of ﬁrms at
the end of stage 2. From equation (4) ﬁrm proﬁts are
SΠ(N2) =
1 + Λ
2(2 + σ(N2 − 1) + Λ))2 (5)
Coalition formation stage At this stage those ﬁrms who entered may merge to form a
coalition. A coalition structure is said to be an outcome of a Nash equilibrium if no player has
incentive to either (individually) migrate to another coalition or to stay alone (Vasconcelos (2006);
Yi (1997))4. Consider a coalition structure composed of coalitions of the same size. It is said to
be stand-alone stable if
N2
N
[SΠ(N2|Λ,σ)] > S[Π(N2 + 1)|Λ,σ] (6)
In case of monopoly, N2 = 1. Hence, in order for a single ‘grand coalition’ to be the outcome of
a Nash equilibrium of the coalition formation game in exogenous sunk cost industries, the following
is a necessary and suﬃcient condition5
Π(1)/N > Π(2) (7)
Hence,
(1 + Λ)




(2 + σ + Λ))2
4(1 + Λ)
≡ ¯ N(σ,Λ) (8)
I restrict the industry conjectural variation coeﬃcient to the range −1 ≤ Λ ≤ 1. In so doing,
the possibility of Λ being larger than the value that would imply perfectly collusive post-merger
behaviour is restricted.
A merger towards monopoly leads to the formation of a single grand coalition with N ﬁrms.
A ﬁrm belonging to the initial wave of N entrants will get a share 1/N of the coalition overall
4To be more precise, this latter case in which no ﬁrm can unilaterally improve its payoﬀ by forming a singleton
coalition is called stand-alone stability. However, stand-alone stability is a necessary condition for Nash stability.
5The only possible deviation it is in fact towards the singleton coalition.
7proﬁts, whereas by free-riding on its N-1 merging rivals it can obtain duopoly proﬁts. Each time
in which the ‘grand coalition’ is unstable, as market size increases, more ﬁrms want to enter and
to free ride and form a duopoly instead of joining the grand coalition. That means, as the market
size rises, the concentration ratio goes down 6. This result shows how this process in turn aﬀects
the one ﬁrm concentration ratio, C1 =
q
N2q = 1/N2.
When Λ lies in the range previously deﬁned, and ﬁxed costs are zero, N(σ,Λ) is strictly de-
creasing in Λ. Therefore, the weaker the competitive intensity, the larger the pre-merger market
concentration should be for a monopoly to emerge through merger.





The RHS is strictly decreasing in Λ. As Λ approaches -1, the value of perfect competition,
condition (9) is alway satisﬁed, and so, merger to monopoly would occur whatever the number
of ﬁrms in the industry. Hence, the higher the intensity of competition at stage 3, the lower the
pre-merger market concentration could be in order for a monopoly to emerge through merger.
When Λ = 0, that is ﬁrms behave as in Cournot, monopolization will occur only if σ ≥ 0.83. If
this condition is not met and more than two ﬁrms enter in stage 1, and merge in a single grand
coalition, that equilibrium might not be stable. As σ approaches 1, competition becomes tougher as
products are closer substitutes, and the lower bound to the one ﬁrm concentration ratio decreases
as market size increases. On the other hand, in perfectly cooperative industries, where Λ = 1,
or when demands are perfectly independent, where σ = 0, merger to monopolization will never
occur. However, it is important to remark that we are not considering cost eﬃciency gains that
would probably give an incentive to merge even in the case that market demands are completely
independent.
Entry stage At stage 1 ﬁrms decide to enter.
If σ = 1 products are perfect substitutes, a merger to monopoly will occur at the second stage
of the game if ﬁrms compete very toughly. Then, if ﬁrms anticipate that a monopoly coalition
6It is valuable to remark that in this model it is implicitly assumed that the pre-merger behaviour is not aﬀected
by the coalition formation stage.




(SΠ(1)) ≥  (10)
where  > 0 is the entry fee. By the same reasoning, therefore, if the competitive intensity
is extremely strong, the ﬁrms will merge to monopoly. For any given level of market size, the
equilibrium level of concentration is higher. However, entry will occur at the ﬁrst stage and the
lower bound to concentration goes down7. If products are imperfect substitutes - and Λ = 0 - a
merger to monopoly might not take place. In particular, when σ < 0.83, a merger to monopoly
might not take place since a ﬁrm could prefer to get all the proﬁts of a duopolist. This means that
as the market size rises, more ﬁrms enter and this makes the monopoly unsustainable as individual
ﬁrms want to free ride and form a duopoly. Thus, there is an upper bound to concentration that
goes down as market size increases (Vasconcelos (2006)).
5 The Italian retail banking industry
The presence of diﬀerent territorial dynamics is a characteristic of the Italian banking industry
(Guiso et al. (2004), Guiso et al. (2006); Colombo and Turati (2004)). I consider the retail Italian
banking industry as belonging to an industry of the ﬁrst type, where sunk costs are exogenous
and the size of the submarkets is provincial. Since lending and borrowing take place mostly in
a narrow geographical place and operation are similar and repeated during time, this industry
can in fact be viewed as made of a large number of local markets, corresponding to diﬀerent
provinces (geographical units close to US counts). These submarkets are independent both from
the supply and demand side. On the supply side, in each one of these independent submarkets,
banks’ goods are fairly substitute whereas banks’ products of neighbouring provinces are not. In
particular, in each province banks can mitigate price (interest rate) competition by means of their
branch location8. However, opening new branches, independently of the size of their operations,
7Also, from the previous analysis, since ∂Π/∂N < 0 and ∂Π/∂Λ > 0, by applying the implicit function theorem,
one concludes that ∂N/∂Λ =
−∂Π/∂Λ
∂Π/∂N > 0. The equilibrium number of ﬁrms is decreasing in the intensity of
competition at stage 3.
8See also Cerasi et al. (2002) and Cohen and Mazzeo (2004)
9has ﬁxed costs, for example the cost of hiring personnel, the cost of renting or buying facilities in
particular province and other province speciﬁc elements. As documented in (Cerasi et al. (2000)),
in Italy in the recent years, as a result of reforms on entry and branching regulation, the cost of
branching has decreased. On the demand side, despite the advances in home and phone banking,
preferences of customers seem to be still biased toward entities with strong regional and local
contents. A customer is likely to shop only at those banks that operate in the local area where he
lives and works. In other words, zero/small cross-elasticities are likely to characterize the demand
of geographically separated submarkets whereas positive elasticities are likely to characterize the
demand in each province.
6 Exogenous or endogenous sunk costs?
As we would expect both exogenous and endogenous sunk costs to be relevant in the banking
industry, with both horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation, some point of remarks are deserved.
In this work I am considering the retail sector by looking at branches as the main distributional
channel of certain standardized banking products. Therefore, I am not looking as in Dick (2007) at
branches, as one of the costs in advertising and quality (employee compensation, branch staﬃng)
that banks will incur in order to enhance consumer willingness to pay. Indeed, as banks become
more and more visible through branches, one could consider branches as a form of advertising itself.
In other words, I am assuming that branches of diﬀerent banks oﬀer similar (bundle of) services
despite bank size and, hence, the number of branches in a given submarket could be considered
as the number of varieties of services oﬀered by banks. Even in the case, however, there are
circumstances in which endogenous costs could arise. As pointed out by Petersen and Rajan (1995)
relationship lending may generate severe barriers to entry. However, the advent of information and
communication technologies increased the ability of banks to open branches in distant locations,
considerably reducing the cost of distance-related trade and enhancing competition in local banking
markets (Berger and Udell (2006), Aﬃnito and Piazza (2005))9. In addition, developments in the
9Besides, Berger himself has recently taken an opposite view with respect to his previous study (Berger et al.
(2003)) where it is claimed that services to small ﬁrms are likely to be provided by small banking institutions
since they meet the demands of informationally opaque SMEs that may be constrained in the ﬁnancing by large
institutions. He now claims that this vision could be an oversimpliﬁcation: new transaction technologies are now
available enabling large banks to overcome informational constraints.
10ﬁnancial industries with new contracts and new intermediaries are likely to reduce the role of close
bank-ﬁrm relationships (Rajan and Zingales (2003)). The opinions are not unique. Whatever the
conclusion might be, we can foresee that it will at least inﬂuence the structure of the banking
system in terms of the local nature of the banks but not the number of branches that could be
opened given market demand10. It is obvious that in the industry as a whole (retail and wholesale)
both endogenous and exogenous interact costs with one another to determine market structure.
The approach and conclusion could be very diﬀerent (Dick (2007)).
7 Market equilibrium
The predictions of Sutton’s model apply to markets in equilibrium. However, discontinuities in the
normative (or economic) conditions can lead to process of consolidation. Unless we are observing
the market at the end of this process, it will be diﬃcult to disentangle the relationship between
competition and concentration as predicted by Sutton from that caused by mergers and acquisi-
tions. This means that I am making the implicit assumption that the retail baking sector reached
an equilibrium in 2005, the year for which I collected the observations. This assumption - though
strong - seems reasonable. Beginning in the 1980s, the Italian Banking system underwent a series
of reforms aimed at increasing the competition in the market through liberalizing branching and
easing the geographical restrictions on lending. In fact, the opening of new branches had been
regulated by the ‘branch distribution plan’, issued every four years. The last distribution plan
was issued in 1986 and, since March 1990, the establishment of new branches has been completely
liberalized. The number of branches increased steadily, up to 31.081 in 2005, as well as the number
of people served by each branch, 47 per 100.000 inhabitants in 2004 (compared to 59 EU mean).
In particular, the number of banks mergers and acquisitions of control per year was 45 in 1990
and decreased substantially to 5 in 200511. At the same time, in more than 50% of the provinces,
new banks entered the market. This process of new entry, parallel to the process of consolidation,
made the average number of banks in each province rise from 29 in 1990 to 34 in 2005.
10To have a picture of the role of local banks and how the probability of branching in a new market depends on
the features of both the local market and the potential entrant, see Di Salvo et al. (2004), Bofondi and Gobbi (2004)
and Felici and Pagnini (2005).
11Referring to December 2005. It is important to remark that the process of consolidation with foreign banks is
now gaining relevance. See ICB (2004).
118 Characteristics and construction of the dataset
The dataset is composed of 103 Italian provinces and 784 banks. In total, there are 85 groups
of banks to which 230 banks belong. The greater part of banks, 554, does not belong to any
group. The Italian territory is divided into 20 regions and 103 provinces, which are geographical
units close to US counties. For each provinces, I have data on the number of banks and their
number of branches for the year 2005 as collected by the Italian Central Bank (Banca d’Italia)12.
I also have data about GDP, number of inhabitants, density of population as collected by National
Institute of Statistics (Istat). According to the criteria developed below, four provinces will be
excluded when estimating the submarket size since these are - by deﬁnition - considered ‘isolated’
provinces13. A description of the variables involved in the analysis follows, as well as indications
for the theoreticals variables they should account for. The name of the variable that will be used in
the empirical assessment is reported in square brackets. Summary statistics are reported in tables
(1).
• Concentration = C1
To measure concentration the ‘one-bank concentration ratio’, [C1], is used. The bank con-
centration ratio is deﬁned as the fraction of the number of branches owned by the largest
bank within the market.
• Market size = S
It is likely to vary with the level of demand measured by GDP, [V A_pct], and by population,
[logPOP], in the province considered14.
• Intensity of competition and product diﬀerentiation = Λ and σ
So as to control for diﬀerent market features, I control for population density, [DENS],
measuring thousands of people per Km2. The higher the density, the lower the number of
12http://siotec.bancaditalia.it/sportelli/main.do?function=language&language=ita.
13These provinces are: Potenza, Palermo, Trapani and Sassari. Therefore, in that case I considered 573
banks or group of banks over 99 provinces for a total of 2673 observations. I do not consider in this
count the number of branches belonging to foreign banks. For further information, see ICB (2005) and
http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/ricec/relann/rel05/rel05it /vigilanza/rel05_attivita_vigilanza.pdf
14Since data on GDP for the year 2005 was not available,in the analysis I used the percentage of value added per-
taining to each province for year 2004. The relative position of each province is unlikely to markedly change
from one year to another. Regarding data on population for the year 2005 I relied on Istat forecasting at
http://demo.istat.it/stimarapida/
12banks: comparing two submarkets with the same number of inhabitants, I expect that the
number of branches will be less in the submarket with a high population density.
To measure the intensity of competition and product diﬀerentiation, I computed three indices:
- [K] = Totalbranches/Km2. It represents the monopolistic power of each branch and could
be considered as a proxy of the (inverse of) transportation costs. More branches in the same
provinces means, for each consumer, a lower distance to cover to reach a branch, a weaker
power exerted by bank branch and an overall higher degree of competition.
- [P] = Totalbranches/Population. It is the number of branches for a thousand inhabitants.
The higher P, the higher the competition. It can be considered as a proxy for the (inverse
of) queueing costs. The less the population served by each branch (or the higher the number
of branches for each individual), the lower the cost met by the customers15.
- [CV ] =standarddeviation/Branchesmean. It is the coeﬃcient of variation. It is a di-
mensionless number and it is calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean
of branches in each province. The higher the CV, the higher the degree of diﬀerentiation
by branches opening, since some bank has smaller branch network size whereas others have
greater branch network size.
• Market Borders
Since the unit of observation is the bank (or group of banks), I also compute for each bank
in every submarket (province)
- the total number of its own branches [NB_OWNim]
- the total number of branches of its competitors [NB_COMPim]
The same quantities are also computed for all the ‘closest’ provinces (less than 100 Km)
[NB_OWN_OUTim] and [NB_COMP_OUTim]16.
15It is interesting to note that these two indices, K and P, split the information contained in the density of
population, DENS = population/Km2
16I performed an alternative analysis computing the number of branches of each bank, and those of its competitors,
outside the province but in the same region. The reason for trying this speciﬁcation is to test the alternative regional
dimension for market size that is, in general, used by the authorities or in similar studies. The results are substantially
analogous.
139 Intensity of competition and concentration: Empirical
model and results
According to Sutton’s model, the number of branches per submarket is a function of the relative
size of the submarket, of the intensity of competition and of the cost incurred to entry. As market
size increases, proﬁts also increase, and given free entry, other ﬁrms will enter the market until
the last entrant just covers the exogenous cost of entry. As the previous analysis also showed, the
relationship between the number of ﬁrms (or concentration) and the market size will in general
depend on the intensity of competition and the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
The Italian Antitrust Authority deﬁnes the province as the market geographical scope. Prior
to analyse the relationship between the one-bank ﬁrm concentration ratio and market size, this
hypothesis is tested.
10 Model description: identifying the size of the submarket
In order to test the submarket dimension, I construct a model for the number of competitors in
each province. Given the data, no observations are possible for provinces with zero banks, since
a criterion for sample inclusion is that there is at least one banks in the province. This is to
be distinguished from datasets without 0 values, but which may have 0s. Thus, the dependent
variable of the model, the number of banks in each province, is truncated at zero, taking only
positive values. A zero-truncated Poisson and Negative Binomial models are therefore appropriate,
since these models allows us to take into account that the dependent variable, NFIRMS, is also
a non negative-integer. The truncated densities of these models are easily obtainable by slightly
modifying the untruncated models and have been presented in Cameron and Trivedi (1998), Gurmu
and Trivedi (1992) and Gurmu (1991).
The latent variable, NFIRMS∗, is assumed to be
NFIRMS∗
im = X0
imδ + eim (11)






im > 0 (12)
Since not all of the 573 banks (or group of banks) are active in every province, the subscript
im goes, for each m, from Nm−1 +1 to Nm, where the total numbers of banks, Nm = Nm−1 +nm,
gets incremented by nm, the total number of banks in each province and N0 = 0. The overall
sample size, n1 + .... + n99, is equal to 2673. Observations may be considered independent across
provinces (clusters), but not necessarily within groups. Cluster devices must be adopted. The
number of bank branches in each province, NB_OWNim is likely to vary with the level of demand.
Therefore, it is reasonable in the estimation to control for the level of demand, represented by
GDP, [V Am_pct], and the population spread, [DENSm]. Furthermore, to account for diﬀerent
intensity of competition in the province, I computed two indices of competition, Km and Pm
17.
Then, to take into account the border of submarkets, I consider the number of branches of each
bank in each province [NB_OWNim] and outside the province [NB_OWN_OUTim], and the
number of branches of ‘other banks’, distinguishing them between competitors’ bank branches
in the same provinces [NB_COMPim] and competitors’ bank branches outside the provinces
[NB_COMP_OUTim]18. The degree of product diﬀerentiation is captured by the coeﬃcient of
variation, [CVm], that measures how banks are diﬀerentiated in terms of total size of their network
of branches inside each province. For the Poisson model the probability that there are exactly N
ﬁrms in the market, conditional on N being greater than zero, is





for N = 1,......,∞ and γim = exp(δXim).
Unlike the Poisson distribution, the zero-truncated Poisson distribution does not present equidis-
persion (that is, the equality between the conditional mean and variance). In fact, the average of the
17See section 4.
18Please see note 14.
15truncated distribution is higher than the average of non-truncated distribution while its variance
is smaller. In addition, contrary to the non-truncated case (Asplund and Sandin (1999)), the esti-
mates of the regression parameters will be biased and inconsistent in the presence of overdispersion
because consistency requires the proper speciﬁcation of all the moments of the underlying relevant
cumulative distribution. These ﬁndings are similar to the result that the Tobit estimator, unlike
ordinary least squares, yields inconsistent parameter estimates in the presence of heteroscedasticity
(See Grogger and Carson (1992)). Given the importance of accounting for overdispersion in the
truncated context, I also present a model for truncated counts based on the Negative Binomial
distribution. The conditional distribution of a truncated Negative Binomial is
Prob(NFIRMSim = N|N > 0) =
Γ(N + 1
α)











As for the Poisson distribution, the average of the truncated negative binomial distribution is higher
than that of the non-truncated one. Though the truncated Poisson distribution no longer shows
the equidispersion characteristic, the truncated Negative Poisson model introduce overdispersion,
in the sense that its variance is higher than that of the Poisson19.
11 Model description: testing market size-market concen-
tration relationship
In practice the relationship between market size and market concentration has been investigated









The constant represents the value of the limiting concentration as the market size approaches
inﬁnite, that is C∞ = exp(a)/1+exp(a). The most used approach is the Smith’s two step procedure,
where the error distribution is a two or three parameters assumed to be drawn from a Weibull
19For the truncated Poisson distribution the ﬁrst and the second moment are:
• E(N|N > 0;X) = u = λ + σ
• V (N|N > 0;X) = σ2 = λ − σ(u − 1)
with σ = λ/(eλ − 1). The mean and the variance of the truncated negative binomial regression are the following:
• E(N|N > 0;X) = u∗ = λ + σ∗
• V (N|N > 0;X) = σ∗2 = λ + αλ − σ∗(u∗ − 1)
with σ∗ = λ/((1 + α)α−1λ − 1).
16distribution. See for example Marìn and Siotis (2007). Lyons and Matraves (1996) proposed to
use a stochastic (cost) frontier approach, allowing for disequilibrium deviations from the bound.
As estimating a stochastic lower bound by maximum likelihood methods is possible only when
the least squares residuals are positively skewed, Symeodonis (2000) suggest to simply use OLS
regressions. I will follow Giorgetti (2003) relying on quantile regression, as estimations obtained




) = a + a1TY PE1 + a2TY PE2 + a3REGION1 (16)
+a4REGION2 + b 1
log(S/) + v
where TYPE and REGION are dummies variables, which account for diﬀerent macro regions in
which the Italian territory can be divided and for the diﬀerent type of banks. For example, the
limiting concentration ratio in a province in the NORTH, where the major bank is a cooperative,
will be equal to C∞ = exp(a + a1 + a3)/1 + exp(a + a1 + a3).
12 Results
The results of the zero truncated Poisson are reported in table (2). These results suggest that
province could be considered - in general - as an independent submarket. As expected, the value of
the coeﬃcient is higher for branches in the same provinces [NB_OWNim] and [NB_COMPim],
and lower and close to zero for banks outside [NB_COMP_OUTim]. Regression in column
2 and 3 in table (2) replicate the analysis in column 1 accounting for i) diﬀerent macro-regions
(REGION1=Nord,REGION2=Centre, REGION3=South) in which it is possible to group provinces,
and ii) diﬀerent types of banks (TY PE1=BCC, TY PE2=BP, TY PE3= S.p.A). The inclusions of
these variables improve the explanatory power of the model (likelihood ratio tests are signiﬁcant).
In particular, supporting the point of independence among provincial submarkets, we can accept
the null hypothesis that both the coeﬃcients of branches belonging to banks outside the province
are zero. The sign for the K coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant whereas the value of the P
coeﬃcient is smaller, positive and signiﬁcant. These results suggest, as one could expect, that
transportation costs are more relevant in the retail market, and, therefore, a higher branch density
increases competition lowering the expected (ex-post) number of banks. The value of the coeﬃcient
17on CV is positive and signiﬁcant. In accordance with the model developed in the previous section,
the higher the degree of diﬀerentiation, the higher the number of banks. Since consumers have
preferences about total number of branches, some banks have greater network size with respect to
other competitors and are able to capture more consumers by diﬀerentiating themselves by opening
more branches. In equilibrium, therefore, higher asymmetry in branch size (a higher value of CV)
is compatible with a large number of banks. On the contrary, the sign of the coeﬃcient for the
density of population is signiﬁcant with unexpected signs, where GPD is positive and insigniﬁcant.
This is probably due to the non-linear relationship between these variables and the dependent vari-
able, and to the fact that higher density will capture the same eﬀect of GDP (since higher density
is associated with higher GDP). Results for the zero Truncated Negative Binomial are reported
in table (3). These regressions are in line with those of the zero Truncated Poisson. However,
our interest lies in measuring the change in the conditional mean of NBANKS when regressors
X change by one unit, the so called marginal eﬀects20. For reporting purposes, in tables (4) a
single response value - the mean of the independent variables - is used to evaluate the marginal
eﬀects for regression 3 in table (2) and (3). At this point it is important to control for overdisper-
sion, since in context with truncation and censoring it leads to problems of inconsistency (Hilbe
(2007)). Several test procedures can be followed to test the (truncated and untruncated) Poisson
model against the Negative Binomial model. As the Negative Binomial model degenerate into a
Poisson model when α = 0, all tests (score test, Wald test, likelihood test) are based on testing the
overdispersion parameter α equal to zero (Yen and Adamowicz (1993)). Since both the Poisson
and the Negative Binomial model have been estimated a likelihood-ratio test is straightforward.
From the previous tables, it is possible to compute the likelihood-ratio test of α = 0. This is the
likelihood-ratio chi-square test that is equal to χ2
(1) = −2(ll(Poisson) − ll(NegativeBinomial)).
The large test statistic would suggest that the response variable is over-dispersed and it is not suf-
ﬁciently described by the Poisson distribution. In all cases, this test is signiﬁcant (for example, for
regressions (3) is equal to χ2
(1) = 357.26, p < 0.001). In the end, these preliminary analysis allows
me to analyse the main relationship of interest, that is the one between the size of the market and
20For linear regression marginal eﬀects coincide with the estimated coeﬃcients. For non linear regression this is
no longer true. In that case, E[NBANKS|X] = exp(X0β), then ∂E[NBANKS|X]/∂X = exp(X0β)β is a function
of both estimated parameters and regressors.
18the one-ﬁrm concentration ratio at the provincial level, relying only on a subsample made of one
observation for each submarket. I will measure market size by means of two variables: the popu-
lation in each province and the number of banks as estimated in previous section. Concerning the
choice of this latter variables, it important to notice that in homogeneous industries, the number
of ﬁrms represents the ratio between market size and sunk costs, that is S/ . In addition, I can
rely on 99 submarkets instead of 103 since four provinces have been excluded from the previous
regressions as were considered isolated by deﬁnition. Tables (5) and (6) report quantile regressions
for the ﬁfth, tenth and ﬁftieth percentile. Results are very similar and support the hypothesis
that the retail banking industry is characterized by exogenous sunk costs: the estimated limiting
concentration, C∞, approaches zero as the market size approaches inﬁnite. It would be better to
have an industry with endogenous costs so as to compare the value of the limiting concentration.
However, the quantile regressions, using both measures of market size, indicate that when market
size increases, the concentration index goes down. This result is weaker in provinces located in the
South and in the Centre whereas it is stronger in province where the main banks is a TYPE2 (that
is, Banche Popolari).
13 Robustness checks
The aim of this section is to control for issues that could weaken previous results, mainly endo-
geneity and model speciﬁcations. Endogeneity may be an important concern when testing the
size of each submarket, since there are variables that could be considered jointly determined with
the number of banks if the industry has not reached an equilibrium. In particular, at ﬁrm level,
a troubling variable could be the number of branches a bank has in the province (NB_OWN).
The easiest way to test for endogeneity is to use a method suggested by Wooldridge (1997) for
count models with endogenous explanatory variables along similar lines to those suggested in other
limited dependent variable contexts by Smith and Blundell (1986) and Rivers and Voung (1988).
For any given explanatory variable x which is potentially endogenous, it is possible to estimate a
reduced form regression of the form
x = z0π + v (17)
19where z represents a vector of exogenous explanatory variables including at least one not included
in x for identiﬁcation, π the vector of reduced form coeﬃcients and v is the reduced form error term.
If it is possible to obtain consistent estimates of π, Wooldrige shows that the residuals ˆ v = x−z0ˆ π
can be included as an additional covariate in a maximum likelihood estimator for count data model.
A signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on ˆ v in the augmented regression is a robust test of endogeneity of x. I test
for possible endogeneity of NB_OWN using as an identifying instrument the same variable in year
t−2. The reason to choose NB_OWNt−2 instead of in year NB_OWNt−1 is to avoid the risk of
unit root. The reduced form is presented in table (7), whereas the residuals from this regression
are then used as an additional covariate in the zero truncated Negative Binomial regression in
table (8). The coeﬃcient of the residuals is not signiﬁcant, suggesting that in year 2005 the Italian
Banking industry reached an equilibrium. To analogous (not reported) conclusions leads a test for
endogeneity of NB_OWN and NB_COMP. Another concern is related to the speciﬁcation on
the model for the relationship between market size and the one ﬁrm concentration ratio. A better
alternative to estimate a model where the dependent variable is a proportion is to use generalized
linear models (Papke and Wooldridge (1996)). Results reported in table (9) conﬁrm those obtained
by means of standard regression model .
14 Conclusions
The aim of this work was to test Sutton model of independent submarkets checking his predictions
for the Italian retail banking industry and using the framework for the exogenous sunk costs
industries. Even though the banking industry as a whole should be considered as characterized
by endogenous sunk costs, there are several features that indicate the retail industry to be one of
the former type. In particular, as banks branches sell slightly diﬀerentiated products in the retail
sector, it is possible to look at the number of banks branches as diﬀerent varieties of the same
product oﬀered by banks to their client. In addition, despite the advances of the phone banking,
consumers’ preferences are still biased toward regional entity, suggesting province as submarket
dimension.
The model developed in the ﬁrst part of the paper indicates which factors should inﬂuence the
20number of banks in each submarket, and as a consequence the one ﬁrm concentration ratio: the
initial number of banks, the intensity of competition and the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
In the second part, a truncated Poisson and Negative Binomial model have been used in order
to estimate the number of banks in each submarket. This way of proceeding allowed me to check
the hypothesis about the size and the independence among submarkets. In fact, the value of the
coeﬃcient on the number of branches for banks outside the provinces, but within a radius of a
hundred of kilometers, turned out to be insigniﬁcant. These results permitted to examine the
one bank concentration ratio at provincial level. Interestingly, the limiting concentration ratio
approaches zero as market size goes to inﬁnity. That means that exogenous sunk costs are involved
in the Italian retail banking industry. As argued by Sutton, as the dimension of the submarket
becomes larger, and given free entry, the value of concentration ratio has to go down.
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25Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Nbanks 34.598 19.096 8 86 2673
C1 24.869 8.153 12.963 80.672 2673
CV 1.626 0.419 0.691 2.648 2673
DENS 0.033 0.044 0.004 0.264 2673
K 0.002 0.002 0 0.012 2673
P 0.06 0.019 0.022 0.104 2673
NB_OWN 0.001 0.002 0 0.043 2673
NB_COMP 0.045 0.048 0.002 0.231 2673
NB_OWN_OUT 0.005 0.01 0 0.093 2673
NB_COMP_OUT 0.177 0.156 0.002 0.631 2673Table 2: Estimation results: Zero Truncated Poisson
Dependent variable: Numbers of Banks - equation (13)
Variable (1) (2) (3)
NB_OWN 9.242*** 9.080*** 9.043***
(2.062) (1.967) (1.744)
NB_COMP 8.190*** 8.482*** 8.404***
(1.344) (1.242) (1.204)
NB_OWN_OUT -2.699*** -2.122*** -0.874
(0.623) (0.566) (0.594)
NB_COMP_OUT -0.049 0.004 -0.011
(0.182) (0.216) (0.205)
CV 0.167 0.228 0.231*
(0.151) (0.140) (0.134)
K -141.197*** -126.401*** -124.354***
(48.777) (41.179) (39.865)
P 9.768*** 12.335*** 11.658***
(2.876) (2.900) (2.737)
DENS 3.859*** 3.163*** 3.135***
(1.322) (1.105) (1.065)










Constant 2.338*** 2.237*** 2.231***
(0.219) (0.200) (0.191)
ll -9490.302 -9347.755 -9266.454
N 2673 2673 2673
chi2 1051.747 1067.701 1097.830
p 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
27Table 3: Estimation results: Zero Truncated Negative Binomial
Dependent variable: Numbers of Banks
Variable (1) (2) (3)
NB_OWN 9.227*** 8.933*** 9.042***
(2.278) (2.194) (1.890)
NB_COMP 8.564*** 8.615*** 8.527***
(1.428) (1.279) (1.236)
NB_OWN_OUT -2.559*** -2.121*** -0.843
(0.601) (0.562) (0.600)
NB_COMP_OUT -0.032 0.026 0.010
(0.170) (0.206) (0.195)
CV 0.163 0.219 0.222*
(0.142) (0.137) (0.132)
K -141.481*** -124.063*** -121.415***
(48.087) (42.405) (40.864)
P 8.761*** 11.128*** 10.515***
(2.610) (2.885) (2.751)
DENS 3.729*** 3.081*** 3.045***
(1.294) (1.161) (1.115)










Constant 2.392*** 2.289*** 2.278***
(0.193) (0.189) (0.181)
lnalpha -3.676*** -3.831*** -3.930***
(0.371) (0.425) (0.422)
ll -9196.711 -9138.896 -9087.824
N 2673 2673 2673
chi2 600.999 641.091 657.921
p 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
28Table 4: Estimation results: Marginal eﬀects
Variable (ztp) (ztnb) (Variable Mean)
NB_OWN 283.1834 283.0865 .0011403
(52.357) (56.701)
NB_COMP 263.1779 266.9689 .0447364
(36.787) (38.366)
NB_OWN_OUT -27.37672 -26.40309 .005079
(18.463) (18.601)
NB_COMP_OUT -.3452477 .2979915 .1772281
(6.431) (6.110)
CV 7.227972 6.952858 1.625817
(4.238) (4.167)
K -3894.202 -3801.284 .0018006
(1238.163) (1277.182)
P 365.0903 329.2003 .0600712
(87.430) (87.960)
DENS 98.17784 95.34141 .0327039
(32.976) (34.739)
VA_pct 21.21327 20.25852 .0143725
(52.418) (55.120)
REGIONE1 (d) -6.113763 -5.35278
(3.697) (3.708)
REGIONE2 (d) -6.920037 -5.862967
(3.473) (3.508)
TYPE1 (d) 3.423496 3.673721
(1.037) (1.093)
TYPE2 (d) 1.002621 1.144445
(0.392) (0.417)
(d)marginals for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Table 5: Estimation results: QUANTILE REGRESSIONS
Variable Quantile5% Quantile25% Quantile50%
1/log(POP) 51.416*** 37.429*** 34.027***
(5.967) (12.168) (10.508)
REGIONE1 0.186 0.070 0.005
(0.162) (0.160) (0.107)
REGIONE2 0.253 0.035 -0.025
(0.180) (0.172) (0.114)
TYPE1 -0.041 -0.122 -0.204*
(0.111) (0.179) (0.114)
TYPE2 -0.046 0.094 -0.005
(0.116) (0.200) (0.129)
Constant -5.737*** -4.225*** -3.644***
(0.455) (0.949) (0.817)
C∞ REGION1 0.0039 0.0154 0.0256
(0.0021) (.0144) (0.0205)
C∞ REGION2 0.0041 0.0149 0.0249
(0.0020) (0.0142) (0.0198)
C∞ REGION3 0.00321 (0.0144) 0.0255
(0.0015) (0.0135) (.0203)
N 103 103 103
*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
29Table 6: Estimation results: QUANTILE REGRESSIONS
Variable Quantile5% Quantile25% Quantile50%
1/log(banks) 7.556* 7.078 2.947
(4.440) (5.069) (3.001)
REGIONE1 0.428*** 0.232 0.029
(0.099) (0.199) (0.100)
REGIONE2 0.437*** 0.196 -0.022
(0.132) (0.202) (0.102)
TYPE1 0.011 -0.108 -0.198**
(0.186) (0.203) (0.097)
TYPE2 0.057 -0.019 -0.054
(0.089) (0.237) (0.116)
Constant -3.123*** -2.498*** -1.500***
(0.719) (0.818) (0.489)
C∞ REGION1 0.0633 0.0940 0.1824**
(0.0455) (0.0646) (0.0730)
C∞ REGION2 0.0638 0.0909 0.1791***
(0.0441) (0.0655) (0.0679)
C∞ REGION3 0.0422 0.0760 0.1868***
(0.0290) (0.0574) (0.0683)
N 99 99 99
*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01

































* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
30Table 8: Estimation results: Augmented Zero Truncated Negative Binomial






































* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
31Table 9: Estimation results: GLM
As the dependent variable C1 is a proportion, it is to use generalized linear model with family binomial family,
















C∞ REGION1 0.0122 0.3034**
(.0115 ) ( 0.1256)
C∞ REGION2 0.0116 0.2943**
(0.1098) (0.1283)
C∞ REGION3 0.01450 0.3349**
(0.0144) (0.1462)
N 103 99
*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
32